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A b s t r act
The paper introduces a procedure to select an "E-Bayesian"
optimal reply after a non-optimal move in zero-sum games defined
in extensive form. The procedure was suggested by John Harsanyi.
The "e:-Bayesian solution" for the class of zero-sum sequential
games with incomplete information is derived.
"E-Bayesian Solutions"
of
Zero-Sum Games in Extensive Form
1. Introduction
The traditional approach to games in extensive form had always
been to put them in normal form and then derive the optimal behav-
ioral strategies from the optimal mixed strategies. This procedure,
while perfectly legitimate, had the obvious drawback of not going
much insight into the interpretation of the extensive solution of
the game. Indeed, while formal properties of optimal mixed strat-
egies have been studied at length, not much was known about optimal
behavioral strategies (with the notable exception of games with
perfect information).
However, in recent years, there has been some renewed interest
in games in extensive form [A-M, P, W] and the study of some examples
pointed out that indeed optimal behavioral strategies do have a
significantly different rationale (if they have any) than the mixed
strategies. For instance, it can be shown that optimal behavioral
strategies do not guarantee any security level conditional of what
is learned during the game. Nevertheless, they seem to maximize
conditional expectations given the other players optimal strategies
(see [A-M]). Thus, their rationale would be better interpreted in
an equilibrium framework than in a minimax one. The objective of
this paper is to develop such an interpretation in a Bayesian context.
Such an exercise is appealing for at least one reason. From a
2practical standpoint, it is worthwhile to compare the recommendations
of game theory with those of decision theory and inconsistencies
should be resolved or at least thoroughly understood.
Now, it is quite obvious that optimal behavioral strategies
should maximize a player's conditional expectations at each informa-
tion set provided this information set may be obtained with some
positive probability (since otherwise a Bayesian best reply at this
information set would generate not only a preferable conditional
expectation but a preferable unconditional one as well, hence a
contradiction). Thus, our main task will be concerned with the
question of what to do after a non-optimal move.
In principle game theory delineates a set of "optimal replies"
for non-optimal moves. We wish to understand the rationale of such
"optimal replies". An interpretation will be proposed: a player
confronted with a non-optimal move should look at the game as the
limiting case of an E-game in which this non-optimal move had to be
played with some small probability E. Letting E go to zero,
"E-optimal" replies will be derived. Ordinarily the subset of
E-optimal replies will be strictly included in the set of the optimal
replies of the original game. Furthermore, it will be shown that
E-optimal replies are the limits of Bayesian replies for the E-game.
This procedure will define an "E-Bayesian solution".
These ideas are illustrated by means of examples in the next
section. Then in section 3 we derive the E-Bayesian solutions for
the class of sequential zero-sum games with incomplete information
[p-z] .
32. The Main Ideas
2.1 An Introductory Example
Consider the following zero-sum game in extensive form in which
Player 1 is the maximizer and Player 2 the minimizer.
1
-1
Player 1 Player 2
A set of optimal behavioral strategies for this game is (b;d)
but note that (b;ac + (1 - a) d)!1 would do just as well as far as
1the value is concerned if 0 < a ｾ 2' Define a Bayesian optimal
behavioral strategy as one which maximizes the player's conditional
expectation at each information set. Then clearly, (b,d) is the
Bayesian solution of this game.
Note that a strategy in which a # 0 might still be interpreted
as a threat: it is a commitment which should deter Player 1 of ever
playing move a. This interpretation has serious drawbacks; first,
threats should certainly play no role in a zero-sum context, second
if Player 2 may commit himself then this should be explicitly
!/(b;ac + (1 - a) d) means that Player 1 selects move band
Player 2 selects move c with probability a and move d with probabilit J
(1 - a). This notation is used consistently.
4modelled in the extensive form. Consequently this interpretation
does not appear very convincing,
This example was presented to point out that we are likely to
have some difficulties after non-optimal moves, Admittedly these
difficulties are easily bypassed in this case. Our next example
will show that these difficulties may be more serious but it will
also introduce a general procedure to deal with them,
2.2 The Main Example
Consider the following example which may be interpreted as a
one stage simplified poker game. Player 1 receives one card which
be low (L) high (H) , each 'th 'I' 1 Then he maymay or Wl probabl lty 2'
drop (D) , raise 1 (Rl) or raise 2 (R2) . If Player 1 raised, Player 2
may drop (d) or call ( c ) . The corresponding payoffs are shown in
the tree, Player 1 is the maximizer.
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Chance Player 1 Player 2
5To generalize the idea of a Bayesian solution to this game,
the first difficulty concerns the definition of conditional expec-
tatiops given that a player is at some information set. ｈ ｯ ｷ ｾ ｶ ･ ｲ Ｌ
given Player lIs optimal strategy, then one may derive conditional
probabilities on (H,L) depending on which move is played and then
look for an optimal behavioral strategy for Player 2 which maximizes
his conditional expectations. This procedure will work except for
Player lIs non-optimal moves. There the problem of defining a
Bayesian optimal behavioral strategy seems to be self-defeating
since the conditional expectation does not exist. Let us take a
closer look at the example.
There are two extremal sets of optimal behavioral strategies:
or (1 D + 1R2IL)
(1 d + 1c1R2) or (! d + ! cIRl))
Cl2 :: « R2 IH) or (1 D + j R2IL)
(1 d + 1c1R2) or (1 d + ｾ cIRl))
Given Player lIs optimal behavioral strategy, we may derive
the following conditional probabilities:
Prob (HID) Prob (D!H) Prob (H)::
Prob (DIH) Prob (H) + Prob (DIL) Frob (L)
0 1. -2 0:: ::
o • 1 1 1
"2 + - . "23
ＮｾＯ (R21 H) means "play move D if move H is played II. This notat ion
is used consistently.
6and similarly,
Prob (HIR2) = 3
"5
Consequently, if move R2 is played the conditional expectation
of calling is
3 2
"5 • 3 + "5 • (-2) = 1
Thus in terms of conditional expectation Player 2 is indifferent
between move d or move c and his optimal reply at this stage
Ｈ ｾ d + 1c1R2) may indeed be qualified as Bayesian. So far, so
good.
Note, however, that move Rl is non-optimal and that we may not
define a conditional expectation given Rl. But any optimal reply
for Player 2, which has to be a convex combination of u l and a 2 ,
will imply a randomization between d and c and so if we insist that
this strategy be Bayesian, this will imply that the conditional
expectations associated with c or d be equal. This in turn implies
that
Prob (HIRl) 2=
"3 ,
(so that Prob (HIRl) • (2) + Prob (LIRl) • (-1) = 1).
At this point we have two possible interpretations; either to
interpret Player 2's optimal behavioral strategy given Rl as a
threat (see §2.1) or to insist on a Bayesian interpretation.
Let us try to pursue the logic of the Bayesian interpretation.
7If this case "makes sense", it implies that
2Prob (H IRl) = '3
and thus if move Rl is played, then it was played with
probability k, say, with a low card and 2k with a high card. So
that
Prob (H IRl) = _____Pr_o'---'b,-------o(_R-=--lIH) Prob (H)
Prob (R1IH) Prob (H) + Prob (R1IL) Prob (L)
=
1
2k • '2
1 12k • '2 + k • '2
2
= 3"
This suggests that if this non-optimal move was to be played,
l.·t h d'l 1 d d' t 't . ,11soul stl. 1 be p aye accor l.ng 0 some crl. erl.um.-
Let us then define an E-game, the rules of which will converge
to the rules of the original game as E goes to zero. In the E-game
each personal information set should be obtained with a probability
of at least E. Hence the two constraints
Prob (R1IH) Prob (H) + Prob (R1IL) Prob (L) > E
Prob (R2IH) Prob (H) + Prob (R2IL) Prob (L) > E
Letting E go to zero the optimal behavioral strategies of the
E-game will converge to some optimal behavioral strategies in the
original game. For E small enough, the application of this procedure
generates the following unique E-optimal strategy (this will be
proved in the next section).
!/This disturbing implication is the motivation of our analysis.
8ﾫｾ e:Rl + (l - 4a = 3 e:) R2IH) ore: 3
(1:(1 + £. e:) D + 2 £.( 1 43 e:Rl + - 3 e:) R2/L)3 3 3
(£. d + ! c1R2) or (.:!. d + ｾ cIRl))3 9
Note that
Prob (RIIH) = 2 Prob (RIlL)
and so
Prob (HIRl) 2= 3
Thus, it looks like our assumption that Rl had to be played
was the missing part of the Bayesian interpretation puzzle and,
once this requirement is introduced, then the picture gets focused.
2 1Indeed, as e: goes to zero, ae: converges to (3 a l + 3 a 2 ) and so
Player 2's e:-optimal reply to move Rl converges to a subset of the
optimal replies in the original game. We shall call this subset
the "e:-Bayesian solution".
From a practical point of view, our answer to the problem of
non-optimal move is certainly not entirely satisfactory and exogenous
considerations should play a more significant role in the analysis
[L-R, §4-11]. However, it is hoped that these purely endogenous
theoretical considerations may help to develop a better understanding
of the subj ect .
93. The £-Bayesian Solution of Zero-Sum Sequential
Garnes with Incomplete Information
This class of games was introduced in [p-Z] , the value and
the optimal behavioral strategies were explicitly derived. The
objective of this section is to provide the £-Bayesian solution
of these games according to the ideas developed so far. The main
difficulty concerns the degeneracy of the set of optimal behavioral
strategies after a non-optimal move.
3.1 Definition of the Game
The game consists of four steps:
Step 0:
Step 1:
Chance chooses a move k£K according to a
probability distribution pO = ＨｐｾＩｫﾣｋＧ
Player 1 is informed of the move chosen
by Chance, Player 2 is not.
Player 1 chooses a move i£I. Player 2 is
informed of the move chosen by Player 1.
Step 2: Player 2 chooses a move j£J.
Final Step: Player 1 receives an amount k (a reala ..lJ
number) from Player 2.
(Assume that K, I, J are all finite sets).
3.2 Definition of the £-Game
iLet xk = Prob (move i is played I move k was played).
The ｦ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｯ ｷ ｩ ｮ ｾ rule will be added to the original game. Let £
be a small positive number. It is required that
10
Note that it is not assumed that each pure strategy be played
with some small probability. Such an assumption would be more
appropriate for the normal form and ordinarily will generate
different results. Instead, we require that each of Player 2's
information sets be obtained with a probability of at least E.
i 0Thus the xk's are weighted by the initial probabilities (Pk) and
so a non-optimal move might not be played with the same probability
for each k in order to satisfy the constraint.
3.3 The Solution of the E-Game
For all probability distributions PEP = {p = (Pk)kEK I Pk > 0
EPk = I}, define the function u,
u(p) k= Max Min L Pka ..
iEI jEJ kEK lJ ,
and denote by u the concavification of u; i.e., the smallest
concave function f which satisfies f(p) ｾ u(p) for all pEP.
Denote by AO the set of all supporting hyperplanes to u
at p = PO and for all AEA O and iEI denote by 0i(A), a non negative
real number such that
Clearly, o. is a continuous function of A.
1
11
Theorem 3.3.1 For £ < £0' the £-game has a value V(po) and
cS.(A)
l
We shall prove that each Player has a strategy which will
guarantee him at least V(po).
Let ｹ ｾ = Prob (move j is played I move i was played).
l
Denote by AO a supporting hyperplane in AO such that
cS.(A)
l
and, to simplify notation, let ｣ ｓ ｾ
define a G. game the IKlxlJI payoff matrix of which is
l
ｉｬ｡ｾｪ - Ｈａｾ - ｣ｓｾＩ II.
Let ｹ ｾ = Prob (move j is played I move i was played) and y. = ＨｹｾＩＮ J'
l l l J£
Lemma 3.3.2 The behavioral strategy y = (y.). I such that eachl l£
y. is optimal in each G. respectively is optimal in the £-game.
l l
(see lemma 2 in [pJ)that
For each i£I, the hyperplane AO - ｣ｓｾ is a supporting
kL Pka ... Hence, there exists a strategy
k£K lJ
Proof:
hyperplane to Min
j £J
- Jy. = (y.). J such
l l J £
y cS? may be interpreted as the penalty incurred to Player I by
l
playing move i. For a non optimal move, cS? > O.
l Note that
this penalty is the same for all k.
or VPEP k k O-jl: l: Pk(a .. - (>'0 - c.))y. < °
kEK j EJ 1J 1 1
12
By definition of ° there exists
i EP such thatc . , some p
1
. k (>.0 _ c?)\fjEJ L ｐｾ (a .. - >
°1J k 1 -
,
kEK
so that the value of G. is zero and y. is an optimal strategy
1 1
in G.. It follows that, for each iEI,
1
l: l: ｰｾ｡ｾＮｹｾ <
kEK j EJ 1J 1
°° - 0)But l: Pk>'k = u(Pk and so strategy y ensures that Player 2
kEK
will not lose more than
Prob (move i is (- °
- ｣ｾ｝l: played) u(p )
iEI
u(pO) c? ｛ ｫ ｾ ｋ . OJ= - l: ｸｾｐｫiEI 1
< u(pO)
- E l: c? . II
- iEI 1
If >.0 maximizes
y
l: ci (>.) for >'EA O then it can be shown thatiEI
for E °< EO there exists a convex combination (c.). I and points1 1E
Y The proof is quite technical and will not be reproduced here.
'.j
ip in P which satisfy
L 0 i 0YoP = P ,
ie:I 1
L 0 1Yo = ,
ie:I 1
if oi > 0 then y? = e:00 1 ,
if oi = 0 then y? > e:00 1 -
13
Lemma 3.3.3 The behavioral strategy for Player 1,
,
is optimal in the e:O-game.
Proof: Given Player l's strategy, it is easily seen that
iProb (move k was played I move i is played) = Pk. It follows
that Player 1 cannot get less than
i kProb (move i is played) Min L p ak ijje:J ke:K
0 i 0 ｯｾ )= L Yo ( L Pk [A k -ie:I 1 ke:K
L o 0 L o 0= PkAk - Yo 0 0
ke:K ke:I 1 1
- 0 0
= u ( P ) - e:0 L 0 0 I I
ie:I 1
The combination of the two lemmas proves the theorem. Letting
e: go to zero, we obtain the e:-Bayesian solution of the original
game.
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